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WHOSE NATURE? PRACTICAL REASON AND PATRIARCHY
LYNNE HENDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
My comments on John Finnis's Natural Law and Legal Reasoning1 grow
out my concern about the relationship of law to authoritarianism.2 In this
comment, I do not intend to go deeply into the relationship of law to
authoritarianism but rather to sketch out the background of the argu-
ment. It seems to me that authoritarianism, properly understood, is of
great relevance to a symposium on jurisprudence and legal reasoning,
because at a minimum, authoritarianism overlaps with legality's ethic
of rule-following and obedience to authority. Authoritarian attitudes
about authority and morality also are relevant to the jurisprudential
concern with the relation of law to morality. Finally, authoritarianism
is of particular concern to feminists because one of the most effective
authoritarian systems throughout history has been that of patriarchy.
3
Even the work of Professor Finnis, with its obvious concern for human
beings, contains authoritarian elements and perpetuates patriarchy by
omitting the voices of those human beings who are female and by sub-
ordinating women to his vision of human good. For example, in the piece
that is the catalyst for this commentary, Finnis privileges reason over
desire, mind over body, and authority over cooperation; the privileging
and dichotomizing of these elements of human experience produce a vision
+ Copyright 1989 All rights reserved.
*Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. This essay is an ex-
panded version of a presentation given at the Conference on Practical Applications
of Jurisprudential Thought held at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I am
grateful to the sponsors of the Conference for the honor of inviting me to comment
on the work of John Finnis and for their kind hospitality, and I thank my Cleve-
land-Marshall colleagues for their interest and support for this commentary. I
also wish to thank the University of Texas and the Indiana University faculties
for their helpful comments on presentations of "Authoritarianism and the Rule
of Law"; the contributions were extremely useful to me in the development of
this presentation. I thank John Finnis and David Luban for their thoughtful
observations on the presentation and my colleague Lauren Robel for her comments
on an earlier draft. Special thanks are due Paul Brest, whose suggestions and
criticisms helped make this a better piece. No one but me is to blame for remaining
errors or for my stubborn insistence on some of my points.
I Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter Finnis, Legal Reasoning].
2 Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, forthcoming 66 IND. L.J.
(1991).
3 See M. FRENCH, BEYOND POWER 338-56 (1985 ); cf. A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST
POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983) (subordination and dominance of women in
history of politics and political theory).
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of the good that has justified patriarchal thought for centuries. Further,
Finnis's argument for self-evident human goods fails to mention the so-
called "feminine" goods of love, care, and responsibility in relationships.
Finally, Finnis's vision of the goals of authority and the good can justify
the subordination of women by ignoring their experiences and by re-
quiring adherence to moral absolutes that embody a male vision of the
good.
In this comment, I first state what authoritarianism means, particu-
larly in the context of law. I then assert that authoritarianism can and
does lead to evil uses of law, and many common jurisprudential arguments
are facilitative of authoritarianism. I then argue that some of Finnis's
work lends itself to authoritarianism. I do not, however, think that law
must of necessity be authoritarian, and I conclude by examining schol-
arship that I believe exemplifies an anti-autoritarian or humanistic view
of law.
II. WHAT AUTHORITARIANISM MEANS
There has been a growing concern with authoritarianism in American
legal scholarship recently.4 But scholars who have spoken of authoritar-
ianism in law often have tended to use the word to identify a variety of
perceived abuses or perversions of law.6 For example, Joseph Vining uses
the terms authoritarian and authoritarianism in his book The Author-
itative and the Authoritarian6 to mean the state of affairs when the Rule
of Law is ignored, 7 or when governments are run by charismatic leaders,"
or when there are regimes of pure power or tyranny,9 or when the legal
system is a "mindless" bureaucracy. 1 Professor Vining appears to assume
that law properly understood cannot be consistent with authoritarianism,
arguing that the internal methods of common law legal practice and
thought are antithetical to authoritarianism in law." But my argument
4 See, e.g., Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2152 (1989); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); West,
The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 531 (1988).
1 Among them, Lon Fuller. See infra text accompanying note 30.
'J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN, (1986).
1 This is at least implicit in his argument that legal process and method are
authoritative, not authoritarian, and his portrayal of the authoritarian as being
in part based on tyranny.
8 Id. at 157.
1Id. at 157.
'0 Cf. id. at 124 (argument for the "personification" of law for authoritarive
law).
"It may be too strong a claim to say Vining sees law, properly, as non-au-
thoritarian, as he notes such things as "An authoritarian streak may be functional
where action is in question .. ", id. at 72, and that passions must be controlled,
making some authoritarianism necessary for law. Id. at 148. See id. at 27-40,
150-58 (arguing that common law method is the non-authoritarian approach to
law). Vining dismisses democracy as nothing more than a "denial of authoritar-




is that certain characteristics of thought about law lend themselves quite
readily to authoritarian uses of law and that Vining's arguments omit
consideration of how closely law and legal reasoning are linked to au-
thoritarianism by his caricaturing of authoritarianism. Thus, it is im-
portant to understand what "authoritarian" and "authoritarianism"
mean.
"Authoritarian" and "authoritarianism" do not of necessity mean right-
or left-wing, "fascist" or "communist". Instead these words describe a
continuum of relationships to and uses of authority, although Vining and
others have treated "authority" and "authoritarianism" as dichotomous
concepts. Authoritarianism may represent a formal process of obedience
or a substantive and complex social and political phenomenon encom-
passing obedience, punishment, and oppression. "Authoritarian" in what
I shall term the "formal" sense may refer to unquestioning obedience to
authority or, as Hannah Arendt defined authoritarian, obedience to tra-
ditional authority out of an attitude of acceptance. 12 While a general
notion of obedience to authority itself is not undesirable per se, but rather
dependent on the goodness or badness of that authority, this attitude
toward authority can create the conditions for substantive authoritarian
political structures and personal epistemologies that have repeatedly
proven to be threaten human dignity and freedom.
Authoritarianism in what I term the "substantive" sense combines an
overriding concern for order and control and insistence on obedience to
rules, authority, and power with absolute demands for conformity and a
punishing, hostile attitude toward those who disobey or are different.
13
The authoritarian attitude embodies a punitive and rigid approach to life
and a suspicious and distrustful view of human nature. Moral absolutism
is characteristic of authoritarianism; rules cannot be questioned, their
authority is always good and right. Significant for the argument that
substantive authoritarianism leads to oppression and willingness to pun-
ish others is that the literature on authoritarianism indicates authori-
tarians are singularly lacking in sympathy or empathy for human
suffering. 14 Authoritarianism in the substantive sense is frequently
linked to xenophobic nationalism or ethnocentrism; in the United States
and Europe, the authoritarian "syndrome" appears to correlate with rac-
ist, anti-Semitic, and patriarchal attitudes. On one view, authoritarian-
ism allocates risk and suffering to those upon whom we project our own
"negative identity"-our fears, our failings, our hatreds, our non-idealized
selves.15 Authoritarian racism, for example, projects onto Black people
2Arendt, What Was Authority?, in NOMOs I: AUTHORITY 81, 82-83 (1959).
"See, e.g., T.W. ADomqo, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK, D. LEVINSON & N. SANFORD,
THE AuTHOrmTuAN PERSONALITY, (abr. ed. 1982) [hereinafter THE AUTHORITAR-
IAN PERSONALITY]; H. KELMAN & V.L. HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE (1989);
A. PERLMUTTER, MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM (1981).
" THE AUTHORITARAN PERSONALITY, supra note 13 at 336-38; See also S. OLI-
NER & P. OLINER, THE ALTRUIsTIc PERSONALITY 174 (1988).
15 K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 23-27 (1989).
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all traits regarded as negative by white culture;- patriarchy projects onto
women the "evils" of sexuality, bodiliness, emotion, and sin.17
A recent study suggests that authoritarian individuals may fall into
two subgroups, rule authoritarians who emphasize obedience to rules and
punishment for disobedience without necessarily identifying with law or
legal rules, and role authoritatians, those who have introjected-taken
as part of their identity -the authority of rules generally and those rules
that define their role or place in the existing political and social struc-
ture. "'8 Rule authoritarians obey law and authority out of fear of punish-
ment; role authoritarians obey out of a sense of moral duty. Because role
authoritarians may be more attached to and identified with institutions
and the rules supporting them, they may be even more willing to be
active in oppressing those seen as deviant than rule authoritarians, who
may feel no loyalty towards those institutions and rules. To the extent
that role authoritarians are more likely to fall within groups with power,
their potential for doing harm may be greater. Both rule and role au-
thoritarians, however, seek predictability and control, are intolerant of
difference, and obey authority unquestioningly, without exercising in-
dependent moral judgment.
The proclivity to obey can be benign as long as the authority and rules
obeyed are benign, but it can be dangerous when part of a system of
repression, intolerance, or evil rules. People who are taught to obey au-
thority as constituted by existing social structures can easily engage in
reproduction of repression of others without thinking that they are doing
anything evil and harmful, and in fact can take pleasure in inflicting
suffering on those defined as deviant or other.
Authoritarian systems may reach the extreme violence of totalitarian
death camps and slavery or the less overtly violent but oppressive systems
of apartheid, Jim Crow, and "internment" camps. The authoritarian struc-
ture of patriarchy, based on the characterization of women as not fully
human and properly destined to be domestics, has an even longer dismal
history as the justification for dehumanization of and violence toward
women and for requiring women to submit to male authority. 9
Law is often implicated in authoritarian structures, because it is fre-
quently the legitimating device used to perpetuate them. Law is not only
ordering relationships, allocating resources, or expressing aspirations, it
is also a method of social control. While we celebrate the Rule of Law as
a brake on oppression and tyranny, we tend to overlook its other side:
The Rule of Law demands obedience to authorities constituted by law or
16 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Un-
conscious Racisim, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
11 See G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PPRJUDICE (rev'd ed. 1982); THE Authori-
tarian PERSONALITY, supra note 13; cf. N. NODDINGS, WOMEN AND EVIL 35-57
(1989)(describing historical attribution of sinfulness to females).
'
8 H. KELMAN & V.L. HAMILTON, supra note 13, at 278-306.
'
9 See M. FRENCH, supra note 3. S. RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TowARDS A
POLITICS OF PEACE 3-9 (1989), contains examples from philosophy, as does Bender,
A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. L. EDUC. 3 (1988).
[Vol. 38:169
WHOSE NATURE
speaking through law. The agents and institutions of law have the power
to compel obedience if it is not forthcoming and to punish those who
disobey. This combination of obedience and punishment is most obvious
in the criminal law, but it is by no means absent from other areas of law.
For example, the power of contempt in civil cases can result in jailing of
persons.20 Courts have resorted to using state force to implement their
decisions, as William Forbath has recently demonstrated in his study of
the resort to force by courts to enforce labor injunctions. 21 Furthermore,
punishment includes harms other than direct inflictions of physical pain,
discomfort, or threats of infliction of pain. Economic harms may also
drastically affect people's lives. For example, money judgments in civil
cases may include punitive damages, damages designed to "punish" the
defendant. Even without punitive damages, money judgments can dam-
age the defendant's economic status and, as a consequence, life and life
prospects or damage the lives of the defendant's employees if the defend-
ant is a business entity.
22
Because law is a major source of normative authority and a tool of
social and political power, and because it is the primary instrument for
the modern state to accomplish its objectives, it should seem obvious that
it is always vulnerable to "capture" by authoritarianism. Indeed, law may
always be authoritarian in a formal sense, because a major supposition
of law is that people must accept it and obey it absent some extraordinary
justification. Moreover, because of legality's ethic of rule-following, we
can quickly fall into the trap of celebrating rules-in-themselves, taking
a simplistic "positivist" position that "law is law", or becoming obsessed
with the study of law-in-itself and for-itself, thereby losing any mean-
ingful critique of the goodness or rightness of the law or rules.
2 3
A recurring jurisprudential preoccupation with the duty to obey law
and with justifying the authority of law2 4 emphasizes law's formally au-
thoritarian nature while consistently overlooking or trivializing the link
of formal to substantive authoritarianism. As Vining has observed, "any
theory of law.., contains an unstated and usually unexamined assump-
tion that people will follow the law. If people don't follow the law, they
Perhaps the most well-known recent case involved Dr. Elizabeth Morgan, a
mother who was jailed for refusing to obey a court order to allow her former
husband, also a physician, unsupervised visits with their daughter. The mother
believed the father was sexually abusing her daughter; the court disbelieved the
evidence of abuse and the father denied abusing the girl. See Apel, Custodial
Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 491, 491-
94 (1989).
21 Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARv. L. REV.
1111 (1989). See also Avery, Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence, 37 BuF-
FALO L. REV. 1 (1989); Gordon, Law and Disorder, 64 IND. L.J. 803 (1989).
22 "If defendant does not pay up, they will take her furniture, they will take
her house, and sell it to satisfy the judgement. That is coercive." Gordon, Un-
freezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. L. REV. 195, 213
(1987).
For a poignant expression of the dangers of this position by a German judge,
see Panzer, American Judges for Peace? (draft, on file with author).
For a recent example, see Soper, Legal Theory and the Claim of Authority,
PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 209 (Summer 1989).
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could be required to. '25 "Required to" are the operative words. The state,
through law, can force people to obey its commands, usually without
having to explain itself. Questions of substantive authoritarianism inev-
itably arise when coercion is at issue but become especially crucial when-
ever law validates and facilitates oppression and violence, either directly
by using state actors or indirectly through tacit state approval of op-
pressive action by private actors.
The belief held by Lon Fuller and others that the Rule of Law protects
us from substantive authoritarianism, or at least substantively author-
itarian law, is misplaced. As Joseph Raz has noted, the Rule of Law is
not of necessity the Rule of Good Law.26 Rule of Law virtues can be
consistent with evil legal systems, and certainly authoritarian systems
can adhere to Rule of Law virtues. The history of the law of slavery and
Jim Crow, together with the history of the internment camps for Japa-
nese-Americans in the United States, provide all-too-real examples of a
substantively authoritarian legal system in a country dedicated to the
Rule of Law. Even the prime virtue of the Rule of Law-that all are bound
by law-does not in any way dictate the content of law. Thus, although
the Rule of Law may be a necessary safeguard against tyranny, it is not
a sufficient one. Authoritarianism is not arbitrariness, whim, or caprice-
it is unremitting insistence on obedience to authority, punishment of those
who disobey, and hatred of outgroups.
Before going farther, I want to stress that by observing that the Rule
of Law does not protect us from authoritarianism, I am not claiming that
the Rule of Law virtues do not have real value or are insignificant. In
criticizing legality's ethic of rule-following, I am not claiming that rules
are necessarily bad, or that rule-following is necessarily bad. I do argue
that it is dangerous to treat rules as absolutes: just because something
is a rule does not entail anything about its goodness or rightness, and
even rules that appear to be good may have oppressive or dehumanizing
effects that we should not and cannot ignore. As an example of the first
point, the Supreme Court's new limitation on affirmative action through
a rule of racial neutrality and color-blindness embodied in Richmond v.
Croson's 7 inclusion of whites as members of a suspect class, while in itself
consistent with Rule of Law impartiality, legitimates the continuance of
racial oppression in this country by ignoring social fact and history.2 As
an example of the second kind of rule, the first amendment's protection
2 J. VINING, supra note 6, at 156.
26 J. RAZ, THE AuTHORITY OF LAW 211-26 (1979).
2 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
28 See former solicitor-general Charles Fried's response to a letter by legal
scholars published in the Yale Law Journal that argued the Court did not outlaw
affirmative action programs in Croson: Constitutional Scholars' Statement on
Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711
(1989). Fried argues that the Court declared affirmative action preferences un-
constitutional. Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.: A Response to the Scholar's Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155, 160 (1989).
[Vol. 38:169
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of speech is a generally good rule, but the protection of violent pornog-
raphy and racist hate speech under the rule that the content of speech
cannot be regulated has the oppressive and authoritarian effect of si-
lencing, dehumanizing, and terrifying its victims, as Mari Matsuda,
Charles Lawrence, Catherine MacKinnon, and others have so effectively
argued.
29
Anglo-American jurisprudential and legal literature on authoritari-
anism's relation to law has been somewhat sparse since the Hart-Fuller
debate over whether the German legal system under the Nazi regime,
one that was obviously authoritarian, oppressive, and evil, was indeed a
legal system at all.30 Yet two scholars have been concerned with the
existence of legal authoritarianism throughout their work. Robert Cover's
work explores the punitive side of authoritarianism in law, while Robin
West's work has examined the side of unquestioning obedience to au-
thority. Cover argued against law's justification for imposing violence and
cruelty on human beings throughout his life, and urged judges and legal
scholars to be aware of the possible tyranny of law.31 West's work fre-
quently explores our tendency to authoritarian submissiveness and ab-
dication of personal responsibility for moral choice through obedience to
authority.3 2 While she often uses "authoritarian" to refer simply to de-
ference to and obedience of authority, that is, in terms of "formal" au-
thoritarianism, she also is concerned that arguments for obedience
mistake authority for the good and thus create the conditions for sub-
stantive authoritarianism by encouraging uncritical obedience to law
with oppressive results. I want to combine these two sides of the author-
itarian coin to argue that authoritarian jurisprudence and decisionmak-
ing models have both the elements of physical and emotional violence
and the element of uncritical obedience to law.
- Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Racist Hate
Speech, forthcoming 1990 DUKE L.J.; C_ MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 163-
97 (1987); Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589;
Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Fem-
inism Unmodified (Book Review), 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 352 (1988). See also S. SCmF-
FRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND RoMANCE(1990); Brest &
Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography
Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1987).
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958).
31 See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975); Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Nar-
rative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601
(1986); Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV.
179 (1985). For full development of the concerns with authoritarianism of Cover
and West, see Authoritanianism and the Rule of Law, supra note 2.
32 See West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions of Franz Kafia and Richard Posner, 99 HARv. L. REV. 384
(1985); West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99
HARv. L. REV. 1449 (1986); West, The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional
Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531 (1987); West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic
Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 817 (1986); West, Adjudication is not Interpretation: Some Reservations
About the Law-as-Literature Movement. 54 U. TENN. L. REV. 203 (1987).
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III. JURISPRUDENCE AND AUTHORITARIANISM
Jurisprudential and legal scholars may promote authoritarian uses of
law in the following ways: by stressing the value of unquestioning obe-
dience to a rule or authority, by denying that there are multiple rules
and authorities available to decide cases in any sophisticated legal sys-
tem, by engaging in stereotypical reasoning, by embracing punitive, op-
pressive results, by justifying the status quo and hypostasizing power
relationships, by emphasizing the need for predictability and control to
the exclusion of other considerations, and by reflexively taking a pun-
ishing approach to disobedience. Professor Michelman has recently ob-
served authoritarian strands in judicial decisionmaking that also reflect
these characteristics.3 3 Formally, judges may invoke deferential obedience
to external authorities or rules. Substantively, judges may refuse to pro-
tect persons from the tyranny of oppressive laws or they may engage in
hostile or stereotypical decisionmaking 3 4
The usual jurisprudential suspect for authoritarian legal thinking has
been positivism; because of positivism's concern with the "is" at the ex-
pense of the "ought", it is easy to see a relationship between exclusive
concern with the internal, self-referential view of law, rule-following,
deference to the commands of authorities, and passivity that can produce
injustices and legitimate oppression. Even positivist scholars who main-
tain an external critique of law or deny that law is a self-enclosed, au-
tonomous discipline can manifest strong authoritarian tendencies. For
example, the work of Judge Richard Posner, who writes in a positivist
mode and uses an external critique founded on economic theory, at times
makes arguments that seem to be explicitly authoritarian. Posner's as-
sertion that law is power and constrained revenge, his portrayal of dis-
obedience to authority as deluded, together with his overall "celebration
of authority 35 in his Law and Literature36 book, have been incisively
criticised and termed authoritarian by a number of reviewers. 37 His ar-
gument that the judge's task in interpreting statutes is one of discerning
the command of the authoritative legislature and following that command
seem sharply at odds with his external critique of law from the standpoint
of economic efficiency and self-proclaimed libertarianism. 38 But it is not
the formally authoritarian obedience to command argument that sepa-
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
Id. at 1496, 1501, 1518, 1522, 1524-25.
W The phrase is Robin West's. See West, Law, Literature, and the Celebration
of Authority (Book Review), 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 977, 981 (1989).
3 R. Posner, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1987).
31 See, e.g., White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 2014 (1989); Weisberg, Entering With a Vengeance: Posner on Law and
Literature (Book Review), 41 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (1989); West, Law, Literature,
and the Celebration of Authority (Book Review), 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 977 (1989).
18 Posner has made these arguments in several articles and in the Law and
Literature book. A recent example can be found in Posner, The Jurisprudence of
Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988).
[Vol. 38:169
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rates his work from other strands of legal thinking. Rather, it is that he
is substantively authoritarian as well: his thought frequently manifests
a social Darwinist approach to legal issues, an approach characteristic of
many American right-wing authoritarian movements. 39 His vision of law
and authority, when combined with his distrust of human nature, his
singular lack of sympathy for human pain and suffering, at least as
expressed in his caustic asides40 , and his laissez-faire 19th century eco-
nomic approach, renders Posner's version of positivistic jurisprudence
deeply authoritarian.
Positivism is not the only authoritarian culprit in legal scholarship,
however. While natural law theory often is associated with revolutionary
and humanitarian liberation movements, including the civil rights move-
ment in the United States, natural law has a strong association with
authoritarianism as well, both as a justificatory device for subordination
of human beings and as a legitimating device for rigid and punitive legal
systems. While the modern and elegant synthesis and development of
natural law theories by John Finnis is initially appealing, because of his
emphasis on human dignity and flourishing and his effort to reinvigorate
notions of the good in law, his work, too, contains both formal and sub-
stantive authoritarian elements.
Finnis has argued subtly and creatively for many moral results we all
may favor, and has brought his considerable intelligence to bear on the
moral question presented by the horror of nuclear weapons with impres-
sive arguments.41 A moral position that emphasizes human flourishing
and calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons at first would appear to be
anti-authoritarian and to come within the model of the human liberation
strand of natural law. But on closer examination Finnis's work contains
authoritarian components. It is formally authoritarian in its stress on
the need for authority and in its insistence on moral absolutes. It is
substantively authoritarian in its patriarchal conception of those moral
absolutes and the good. Elements of authoritarianism can be found in his
works Natural Law and Natural Rights42, The Rights and Wrongs of
Abortion,43 and Natural Law and Legal Reasoning.
44
39 R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1964); S. LIPsETT,
POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 123-30, 169-73 (expanded ed.
1981).
40 See reviews cited supra note 37 for criticisms of Posner's tone; see also, Posner,
The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 1431 (1986) (battered wives may find the alternatives worse; "we ought to
be wary about embracing a system in which government breaks up families to
protect wives against themselves").
4' But see Mark Tushnet's contribution to this symposium, Tushnet, A Critical
Legal Studies Perspective, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV 137(1990) (criticizing method and
underlying assumptions in the nuclear weapons argument).
42J. FINNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1989) [hereinafter J. FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW].4 3 Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion in M. COHEN, T. NAGEL, & T.
SCANLON, eds. THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION 85 (1974).
- Finnis, Legal Reasoning, supra note 1.
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In Natural Law and Natural Rights, authority at times appears to be
absolutely necessary, according to Finnis, to the functioning of human
groups. In the book, he argues that in order for human groups to achieve
any coordination in pursuing common goals, "there must be either un-
animity or authority. 45 This is an extremely strong statement on the
necessity of authority. The claim appears to be based on a particular view
of humans as incapable of existing apart from authority systems: Coop-
eration without complete agreement for reasons of care or responsibility
to others, for reasons of disinterest or disengagement, or under conditions
of continuing dialogue about or experiment with what should or should
not be done, admittedly "bounded" in some sense by cultural and/or lin-
guistic "rules," does not seem to fit his either-unanimity-or-authority
justification for authority or his subsequent arguments for deference to
authority and law in his book and in his Legal Reasoning article. 46 "Work-
ing things out" in a creative manner, rather than deferring to authori-
tative rules or authority figures, does not appear to exist as an actual
human possiblity for Finnis. As a result, obedience to authority and for-
mal authoritarianism appear to be essential to Finnis's thought.
To avoid the potential for substantive authoritarianism created by the
conclusion that authority and obedience to authority are necessary to the
functioning of human groups, Finnis would require authority to embody
certain moral absolutes, or basic human goods. In this way, authority and
the good become the same, and one must obey and follow the good au-
thority, including law. By Finnis's definition, law is a form of authority
to be directed to the common good,47 and therefore law is good. Under
this view, with very few exceptions, legal authority presumptively-al-
most tautologically-creates both a legal and moral duty to obey. Al-
though Finnis does not altogether abandon the strong natural law claim
that an unjust law is not a law, because he would allow disobedience to
laws violating certain procedural requirements or that fail to conform to
the moral standards of the common good, he limits the scope of that
disobedience by invoking the asserted need for authority.48 Even if the
laws violating certain procedural requirements or that fail to conform to
the moral standards of the common good, he limits the scope of that
preserve the authority of law itself.49 Accordingly, the formal authori-
tarian assumptions may make it impossible to avoid at least some sub-
stantive authoritarian uses or understandings of law.
" J. FrN~is, NATURAL LAw, supra note 42, at 232.
"Id., at 245-290.
47 Finnis, Legal Reasoning, supra note 1.
4 Id.; see also J. FINNis, NATURAL LAW, supra note 42, at 352-62.
49 "So, if an unjust stipulation is, in fact, homogeneous with other laws in its
formal source, in its reception by courts and officials, and in its common accept-
ance, the good citizen may (not always) be morally required to conform to that
stipulation to the extent necssary to avoid weakening 'the law', the legal system
(of rules, institutions, and dispositions) as a whole .... the citizen, or official,
may ... have the diminished, collateral, and in an important sense extra-legal,
obligation to obey [an unjust law]." Id. at 361-362.
[Vol. 38:169
WHOSE NATURE
A potential for substantive authoritarianism in the form of patriarchy
lies in Finnis's definition of the common good that the law serves, as well
as in the role of legal reasoning and authority in ensuring the common
good. While it sounds counterintuitive to object to "human flourishing"
as the goal for law, it is Finnis's description of "human flourishing" that
is of concern: "Human flourishing" is described in terms of "the common
good," and the common good is found in a list of moral absolutes, in turn
derived from their asserted "self-evidence." 50 Human life is a basic hu-
man-and common-good. The other basic goods that Finnis has de-
scribed generally are knowledge, friendship, excellence in work and play
and mastery of nature, inner and outer harmony and peace, authenticity
in the sense of congruence of self and behavior, and harmony with a
"reality" that the world has a super-human source of meaning and value,
or relgious belief.51 These goods appear to reflect a particular and deeply
gendered vision of the good: the basic elements of human flourishing listed
appear to be those that would be "self-evident" to the rational white
Western man with a full stomach and a decent education, whose emotional
and physical needs are thoroughly met by something, we are not told
what.
Finnis's vision is one that has omitted the virtues of love, care, and
nurturance 52 and that for centuries has rested on deductive logic to justify
the oppression of human beings who happen to be female. First, a theory
of human flourishing that does not take account of those responsible for
a major part of basic human flourishing seems odd; it excludes the ex-
perience of many, if not most, women. The responsibility for day-to-day
human flourishing has fallen on the shoulders of women throughout time,
whether it be African women who perform 60-70 per cent of the agricul-
tural work necessary to feed their families and tribes, 3 or many American
working women who perform over half of the domestic chores and child-
rearing in two career families and all the work in single parent families.54
Second, humans do not flourish in isolation from one another; infants
need nurturance and care to survive at all. Adults need nurtur-
ance and love as well as friendship. Third, lack of recognition for and the
subordination of the emotional life in human experience promote the
belief that the emotional realm is dangerous, negative, or "less," rather
than being important to being fully human. The denigration of the emo-
50 Id.; Finnis, Legal Reasoning, supra note 1, at 1-2.
51Finnis, Legal Reasoning, supra note 1, at 2. This is a slightly different for-
mulation than that given in NATURAL LAW.
52 Finnis has not claimed that his list was exclusive, only that it contains the
minimal indicia of basic human goods. He has indicated in a personal commu-
nication that he did consider care and love to be goods important to human
flourishing.
Stroebel, REVIEW ESSAY: AFRICAN WOMEN, 8 SIGNS 109 (1982).
14See Belkin, Bars to Equality of the Sexes Seen as Eroding, Slowly, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1989 at 1Y, cols. 1-2; Poll Finds Women's Gains Have Been Taking
Personal Toll, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at 8Y, cols. 1-6; Dionne, Struggle for
Work and Family Fueling Women's Movement, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1989, at 1Y,
cols. 1-2.
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tional could also be used to justify marginalizing the moral experience
of those to whom the life of the emotions has been assigned in this culture,
namely women. The voices of those who have had the responsibility for
these elements of human flourishing should be taken seriously in any
account of the basic human goods. Without addressing these necessary
parts of human flourishing and human goods, Finnis's attempted model
of natural, self-evident truths seems incomplete and ignores a major
strain of developing feminist ethical thought.55 Further, a theory of goods
that rests on their "apparent self-evidence" but denigrates the natural,
the emotional, and the physical realm, thereby failing to account for the
lived experiences of women, leaves out their experience, their "self-evi-
dence." It continues the male model of morality that has been used to
denigrate women, one that has barred women from full participation in
human moral experience.
56
Within the context of human goods and the premise that law is to be
dedicated to common goods, legal reasoning becomes "practical reason-
ing," which in turn is logical deduction from the premise of a basic human
good to its realization. This view of legal reasoning (and presumably
judicial reasoning) as "practical reasoning," while initially seeming flex-
ible because Finnis recognizes that human goods can be realized in var-
ious cultural ways,57 is actually sharply constrained by his argument that
prohibits intentional interference with any "basic human good."58 Legal
thought is to be governed by a moral principle that forbids choosing to
destroy or damage any of his basic goods in any of its embodiments. You
can neither destroy nor damage a good as an ends or a means. The rigid
insistence on logical deduction from the premise that it is immoral to
choose against any of Finnis's "basic human goods" creates a closed system
that can lead to decisional paralysis: The command to not intentionally
damage a human good means that a moral choice such as affirming a
friendship knowing that one must damage one's pursuit of knowledge-
truth-or one's life goal is impossible because it involves intentionally
damaging a basic human good. This would leave legal decisionmakers,
and us, unable to move from the status quo in many instances, which in
turn would allow the perpetuation of existing systems of dominance,
authority, and hierarchy. But I also would argue that more serious prob-
lems arise in Finnis's treatment of conflicts among his identified human
goods, as illustrated in John Makdisi's powerful contribution to this sym-
posium in which he vividly and movingly describes the impact of Finnis's
51 Sarah Ruddick's recent work grounding ethics in the practical experience of
mothering is a superb example of an articulation of many women's moral expe-
hence, choice, and dilemmas. S. RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POL-
f0ICS OF PEACE (1989). See also C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N.
NODDINGS, CARING (1984).
56 For a summary of opinions of male philosophers on woman's ability to engage
in moral discourse and reason, see Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory
and Tort, 38 J. LEG. EDUC. 3, 23-25 (1988).
11 See Finnis, Legal Reasoning, supra note 1 at 2; J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW,
supra note 42.
51 See Finnis, Legal Reasoning, supra note 1, at 2; J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW,
supra note 42, at 118-25.
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system in a situation of tragic human choice. 9 The "incommensurability
thesis"-the argument that basic human goods are not hierarchically
ranked but rather stand orthagonally to each other-,when combined
with the prohibition against intentional damage to a basic human good,
condemns a decisionmaker to immorality if one of the basic human goods
has to suffer at the expense of another.60
Finnis attempts to handle the problem of tragic choice by means of his
definition of "intention." "Intending" to damage a basic human good is
to have a purpose to damage the good. But it seems to me that asserting
that "unintentional" damage does not "count" does not resolve the issue,
unless one is allowed to deny pre-existing knowledge that harm to a basic
good would occur as a result of a choice in favor of another good. For
Finnis, mere knowledge that the good will be damaged if one follows a
particular course of action is not "culpable." Yet knowing that a basic
human good such as life will almost certainly be destroyed and choosing
to pursue a course of action that will inevitably cause that damage are
frequently the same cognitively, experientially, and consequentially as
having a purpose to damage or destroy the good. Recognition of one's
personal responsibility for the harm is not contingent on whether one
"meant" the harm to happen in the sense of the harm being one's goal;
one may still feel and hold oneself responsible.
Further difficulties and contradictions in the incommensurability and
intent theses, as well as the patriarchal assumptions in the basic human
goods, become quite apparent in Finnis' argument against abortion. De-
spite Finnis' general assertion that the basic goods he identifies stand
orthagonally to each other, the incommensurability thesis does not apply
to physical human life, which is hierarchically above all other goods.
Neither incommensurability nor the prohibition on intentional choice to
damage basic human goods applies when the issue is physical existence
as the opposing human good.
As I understand his argument, Finnis would absolutely forbid a woman
to choose against human life, which he has stated begins at conception,
under any circumstance that does not directly threaten the woman's con-
tinuing physical existence. When the woman's life is at stake, the inten-
tionality issue gets muddied. That is, the death of the fetus is not intended;
the purpose of the abortion is to save a life, and the loss of the other life
is either a side effect or offset by a good of equal weight. Otherwise, the
choice is always against abortion. This argument not only results in the
exclusion of women from participation in other common goods by virtue
" Makdisi, Justification in the Killing of an Innocent Person, 38 CLEV. ST. L.
REV 85 (1990).
60 For a more thorough discussion and criticism of the incommensurability
thesis, see David Luban's contribution to this symposium. Luban, Incommensur-
able Values, Rational Choice, and Moral Absolutes, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 65 (1990).
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of requiring them to bear children,61 but also the deliberate choice to force
women to bear children can entail the intentional choices to damage
women's relationships and responsibilities to others -including their nur-
turing and caring for their existing children and relatives-, to force
women to abandon their pursuit of knowledge and excellence in work or
their pursuit of a life project, to require women to sacrifice self and au-
thenticity, to forbid women to "master" nature's biological inevitabilities
no matter what the circumstances of conception, and so on, seemingly in
violation of Finnis's prohibition on intentional choice against a basic
human good. These harms to basic human goods are not mere "side-
effects", but rather are the reality of women's lives under conditions of
forced childbearing and childraising. This virtual prohibition on abortion
also, in terms of his essay on legal reasoning, constitutes an instance of
imposing on all girls and women harms that one would not impose on
one's self or one's friends for no other motive than differential feelings-
that women do not count as much as men or the unborn. It is a choice to
allocate the entire risk associated with the consequences of consensual
and forced heterosexual intercourse to women. In Alison Jaggar's words,
"oppression is the imposition of constraints; it suggests that the problem
is not one of bad luck, ignorance or prejudice, but is caused rather by one
group actively subordinating another group to its own interest. 6 2 In the
instance of forced childbearing, it is women who are pressed into service
of others, whether it be abstract principles, the State, as was the case in
Romania, fetuses/the unborn, or men.
There are other points contained in Finnis's argument against abortion
that denigrate the full humanity of the unwillingly pregnant woman.
Say a woman wants to be not-pregnant, she does not want or intend to
kill. The death of the fetus is, then, a mere side effect; it was not intended
as a means or an ends. My point is different from Judith Thompson's
argument about the violinist,6 3 because it has to do with the intent of the
woman and her moral decisionmaking rather that questions of superro-
gatory actions. Under Finnis's model of intent, the woman would not have
acted immorally, because she did not have the purpose to kill the fetus
any more than the doctor who cuts through the womb of a pregnant
woman to save her life has the purpose to kill the infant/fetus. Of course,
under a consequentialist morality, a different model of mental intent, or
a model that treats purpose and knowledge as equivalent, such as that
61 For a powerful description of women's attempt to become selves and to par-
ticipate in the common goods associated with full autonomy and humanity, see
Hirschman, Bronte, Bloom and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 177, 205-30 (1988).
62 A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLrTCS AND HuMAN NATURE 6 (1983).
See Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABOR-
TION, supra note 44, at 3.
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used by the Model Penal Code in the definition of murder,6 4 it would not
matter: The woman's knowledge that the fetus will most certainly die if
she performs procedure X on herself is the same as having the purpose
to kill the fetus, and she would be culpable for the death.6 5 That is not
Finnis's answer. To avoid this problem Finnis argues in his essay on
abortion that the doctrine of double effect requires that if the fetus is to
die, the action causing the death must be aimed at saving the woman's
physical life in order to justify the otherwise forbidden action.6 6 In other
words, if a "death-dealing deed" is to be justified, it must be "proportionate
(say, saving someone's life) ...,,7
Proportionality, for Finnis, excludes the female experience of what is
proportional and what is not. For example, Finnis has written that the
proportionality "consideration alone might well suffice to rule out abor-
tions performed simply to remove the unwanted fetus from the body of
women who conceived as a result of forcible rape.' '68 In this statement,
perhaps made with regret, that abortion in the instance of forcible rape
would be impermissible under his theory, Finnis chooses to impose enor-
mous suffering on women and to ignore their experience of rape. This
reflects a patriarchal attitude to a women's experience. As West has noted,
[f]rom a subjective, female point of view, an abortion is an act
of self defense ... [but] from the point of view of 'masculine'
subjectivity, an abortion cannot possibly be an act of self de-
fense: the fetus is not one of Hobbes' 'relatively equal' natural
men against whom we have the right to protect ourselves...
• Self-defense doctrine ... simply doesn't apply to such de-
pendent and unequal 'aggressors', indeed the notion of aggres-
sion itself does not apply" in a moral discourse defined by male
interpretations of morality.6 9
-MODEL PENAL CODE E210.2 (1)(a) provides that a killing committed pur-
posely or knowingly is murder. "Knowingly" includes an awareness that the
conduct will almost certainly cause the prohibited result. MODEL PENAL CODE
E2.02(2)(b)(ii). Section (1)(b) makes extreme recklessness killing murder. Reck-
lessness requires an awareness, or knowledge, of the risk created by the defend-
ant's conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE E2.02(2)(c). Extreme indifference to human
life recklessness is equivalent to purposeful or knowing homicide for the purposes
of the Model Penal Code. See Commentary to Section 210.2, reprinted in J. KAPLAN
& B. WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 306 (1986).
1 That there are such procedures that do not involve third parties should be
obvious. See also Kolata, As New Tactic, Do it Yourself, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1989
at B12 cols.1-6 (discussion of self abortion methods being taught to women in
reaction to concern about diminishing rights in the United States and in countries
that prohibit abortion).
Finnis, supra note 43, at 102-03.
MId. at 103.
68 Id.
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 69 (1987).
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To denigrate the gender-specific, soul-murdering harm of what Robin
West has termed "invasive pregnancy" which male theories of the good
simply do not comprehend ignores the self evident truth, for many, if not
most, women who have been raped. Especially in the case of rape-and
by that I mean rapes that go on all the time, whether unreported or
disbelieved, rapes committed by husbands and fathers and "lovers" and
"friends" as well as strangers-the woman may lose her self and her soul
if she is forced also to carry the fetus to term.7° As a rape survivor who
demanded DES, the morning after pill, from the moment I arrived at the
emergency room, my concern was to be not-pregnant. My intent, my
desire, my very being refused to accept the evil of an act that I have
argued elsewhere is a kind of death.71 I was either pregnant or I wasn't,
but my intent was to be in the state of non-pregnancy in order to preserve
my soul and my self from obliteration. To be forced to live with the
invasion of another being as a result of a terrorist act would have been
an unendurable and undeserved punishment. The rapist would have
taken control over my body and my life in the most concrete, tangible,
material way possible. I would have hated the fetus and hated myself.
There is no question, even today, that I would have resorted to any means
to rid myself of the evil result of an evil act, up to and including risking
my own death. To speak of the "innocence" of a biological side-effect of a
horrible crime is, to me, nonsensical. The very thought of the enslavement
of my body and mind by a foreign, invasive, unwanted being fills me with
revulsion and loathing.
If the argument from a woman's point of view of the harm in rape and
a resulting pregnancy is insufficient under the doctrine of double effect,
it is clear that the moral world of women is excluded from the realm of
the moral altogether. The vision which Finnis argues for fails to take
account of women as moral decisionmakers in the context of their self-
evidences. Such denial of women's experience, with the accompanying
pain and torment, is oppressive in the extreme.
Faced with a feminist self-defense argument, an argument that in Fin-
nis's terms would constitute a proportional balance of one self's becoming
against another self's becoming, Finnis could argue against abortion us-
ing the second part of his moral content of legal reasoning, the Golden
Rule, do unto others as you would have them do unto you. According to
this reasoning, a woman could violate the "Golden Rule" by failing to
take the fetus's life into account. First, without listening to women's
voices, it is impossible to say that women do not take the life of the fetus
into account.7 2 Second, on Finnis's account, "Golden Rule" analysis is not
70 See Olsen, Comment: Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV_ L REV 105, 124-
25 (1989); West, Marital Rape and Theories of Equality, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. -
(1990); Estrich, Rape, 96 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Henderson, Review Essay, What
Makes Rape a Crime? (Book Review), 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193 (1987).
71 Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 193 (1987).
72 Feminist authors have made this point numerous times, and Fran Olsen
also notes that prohibiting abortion automatically "denigrates women as moral
decisionmakers." Unravelling Compromise, supra note 54 at 121. See Law, Re-
thinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1019 (1984); Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1629-30 & n.356.
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a "rational" analysis, that is, conflicts under the Golden Rule cannot be
rationally commenserated or resolved. This of course does not mean "ir-
rational" choice; it only means that logical deduction from premises does
not apply to such decisions. Even so, a woman could try to put herself in
the potential child's shoes and decide that, given the circumstances of
the potential child's life, the child would not want to be born given the
pain and suffering the child would have to endure. This seems most
obvious in the case of a severely damaged fetus, but it might also apply
to other cases. A woman could identify with the reality of being unwanted
and determine that if she were the fetus, she would choose not to be born
and would choose abortion. 3 Indeed, she could weigh all the options,
including adoption, and determine that adoption is not the best thing, as
in the case of a severely handicapped infant, or because of the circum-
stances of the fetus's conception. She could also decide adoption is not
desireable, based on her own experience or knowledge of others' experi-
ences as abused adoptees or orphans, taking into account the risk of such
a thing occuring. This is a moral decision that uses guidelines of concern
and care for pain and suffering.
The absence of women's moral considerations in the abortion context
from Finnis's work is telling: women must be either just like men in
moral decisionmaking or their experience, their moral self-evidences do
not count. Patriarchy is an authoritarian system, one of oppression and
subordination of human beings who happen to be female, and Finnis's
argument is one that justifies and supports the conditions of patriarchy
by denying women choice over their reproductive capacity. Half of hu-
manity could be denied pursuit of basic human goods and pressed into
service to others under Finnis's view; half of humanity can be, and has
been, denied full participation in the basic human goods and in the moral
community by patriarchy because of biology.
IV. ALTERNATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
If rule-following, moral absolutes, and even obedience to authority pres-
ent dangers of authoritarianism in legal thought, what are the alterna-
tives? If moral absolutes are dangerous, are we left with only arguments
for moral scepticism, for giving judges total discretion to impose their
own values, or for taking a rebellious or nihilistic stance toward all law,
all authority? Are we left with nothing but raw emotions and no moral
guidance to determine what to do? It seems to me that such a portrayal
of our alternatives not only is false 74, but also it strikes me as strangely
73 A novel that explores the effects on a child born to a mother who tried to
abort her, Marie Cardinale's THE WORDS To SAY IT, suggests what the fetus/child/
adult who is unwanted might go through. Although one can celebrate the fact
that Cardinale's mother did not succeed in aborting her gifted daughter, one can
also ask what of a child who does not have the support and resources Cardinale
was able to have. M. CARDINALE, THE WORDS TO SAY IT (1983).
1 Not to mention that such portrayals silence efforts to escape the existing
paradigms. The threat of chaos can effectively end analysis. See R. ROSALDO,
CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF 98-102, 220-24 (1989)(cultural anthro-
pologist's response to same claims made by critics in social sciences).
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fearful. These virtually preemptive claims against exploring alternative
visions cling to orthodoxy and resignation, negating possiblility and dia-
logue. Abandoning possibility and adopting resignation at the first ac-
cusation of nihilism would be extremely costly for those seeking to make
law humane, responsive, and liberating rather than subordinating.
To be cautious about rules and to be cautious about authority does not
mean one is an anarchist in the negative sense nor does it automatically
render one a moral nihilist. Indeed, there are at least two alternatives to
a jurisprudence of authoritarianism or a jurisprudence that justifies au-
thoritarian decisions and results. The two alternatives are the jursi-
prudence of strong rights and principles and a developing feminist/
humanitarian jurisprudence of understanding and care and responsibility
for others. A third developing area of jurisprudence, that of people of
color, draws on the insights of both rights and understanding and care,75
and holds promise for an anti-authoritarian jurisprudence.
The two alternative positions somewhat resemble the competing models
of moral development posited by Kohlberg and Gilligan,76 but rather than
seeing them as antagonistic, it is more useful and promising to view them
as capable of combination. 77 The approaches are similar in that they are
grounded in valuing human dignity, care, and resistance to cruelty, sub-
ordination, and repression. My choice of these alternatives to authori-
tarian legal thought is based on the fact that they are not only at least
descriptively and theoretically inconsistent with authoritarianism, but
also on the grounds that there is some empirical evidence that demon-
strates the value of these approaches to resisting evil, authoritarian uses
of law and power. Recent studies of attitudes to authority indicate that
the anti-authoritarian orientation includes a sense of the dignity and
rights of others, a sense of responsibility to others, an ethic of care, a
capacity for empathy, compassion, and sympathy, and a sense of inde-
pendence from conventional morality.78 Tolerance of ambiguity and dif-
ference also characterizes the anti-authoritarian attitude, but this by no
means entails inaction or passivity in the face of evil: rather, it is a refusal
to engage in stereotyping of others, a resistance to us/them thinking, and
an ability to place commonality rather than difference at the base of
71 See, e.g, Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987);
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401(1987); Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal
Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989). For a feminist
article in weaving together the ethic of rights and the ethic of care, see Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U.L. REV. 589 (1986).
76 For a summary of the two different stages of moral development used by
Kohlberg and Gilligan, see Blum, Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral
Theory, 98 ETHics 472 (1988); see also C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 24-63
(1982) (describing differences in moral reasoning).
77 See Schneider, supra note 75, for a similar point.
78 See KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 13, at 307-338; S. OLINER & P. OLINER,
supra note 14, at 142-86, 209-22, 249-60.
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relationship. Just as authoritarians are capable of doing good, anti-au-
thoritarians are capable of evil, but their tendency toward inclusion,
relationship, and care mitigates against tendencies toward exclusion,
punishment, and oppression of those who are different or Other and able
to resist intentional cruelty.
Much liberal/progressive legal and jurisprudential scholarship embod-
ies the notion of strong rights and principles, 9 as does Roberto Unger's
argument for "superliberalism" in The Critical Legal Studies Movement °
By "strong rights and principles" I am referring roughly to Ronald Dwor-
kin's definitions in Taking Rights Seriously l . That is, a strong right is
a right such that it would be wrong to interfere with a person's exercise
of that right; principles include the principles of fairness and equal con-
cern and respect for each person. Strong rights are not solely those rights
against the state, or aspects of "negative" liberty, but also can be the
source of "positive" liberty. 2 For example, Unger's "destabilization
rights" are rights to take action to revise existing hierarchy; they are not
simply rights to be left alone. The freedom of intimate association or the
right to material resources necessary for a full existence are other such
rights.8 3 While there is an obvious correspondence among liberal tolerance
and commitment to rights and anti-authoritarianism, I shall not focus
on it here for several reasons. First, liberalism has its eloquent jurispru-
dential defenders who have made the case for rights, principles and tol-
erance forcefully. Second, the concern of liberal legalism often is with the
abuses of power by state action and, accordingly, with negative liberty,
rather than with abuses of power through state ommission allowing
groups to oppress others.8 Finally, for all its strengths, liberal rights-
based theory has failed to give dignity and full humanity to many people
in this culture, including women and people of color. 5 Accordingly, I will
11 There are a number of excellent examples of this strand of liberal legal
scholarship discussed in West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism,
88 MICH. L. REv. 641 (1990) (discussing work of Michelman, Tribe, and David
Strauss, among others). See also RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) and R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) as excellent examples in the juris-
prudential literature.
"R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
81 R. DWORKIN, supra note 79 at 184-205.
12 The separation of "positive" and "negative" rights is usually attributed to
Isaiah Berlin. See I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
(1969).
13 See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980);
Michelman, Foreword-On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969).
"There are, of course, exceptions in the work of many American constitutional
theorists who subscribe to a notion of strong rights and principles.
By saying this, I by no means wish to denigrate the importance of recognizing
rights for those who have not had them. See, e.g., Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401
(1987). My concern is closer to that of Unger's, that liberalism as presently prac-
ticed in Western democracies stops short of delivering on its promise. Moreover,
while I think John Ely's observation that "most fundamental-rights theorists
start edging towards the door when someone mentions jobs, food, or housing" is
unfair, it certainly reflects the Supreme Court's decisions in this area. J. ELY,
DEMOcRACY AND DISTRUST 59 & n.72; Henderson, supra note 72, at 1575 n.5 &
1650.
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briefly discuss the other humanitarian alternative embodied in the schol-
arship of feminists, minorities, and humanitarians of every race and
gender, with particular focus on that scholarship Mari Matsuda has called
"outsider jurisprudence. 8 6 It is a jurisprudence that contests existing
moral absolutes because they are based on androcentric, white Western
European assumptions, assumptions that must be scrutinized in light of
other voicesY I shall refer to it as the humanitarian vision of law.
Humanitarian scholarship does not make claims from transcendent
moral truths or designated authority but rather from care and respon-
sibility for the human condition. For many critical legal studies and
feminist/minority scholars, the question in the instance of legal authority
is always sceptical, because of an awareness of law's authoritarian tend-
encies and a knowledge that law's certainties have been a source of human
misery. But they also recognize the value of law, as an empowering and
facilitating human tool. For many of the humanitarian scholars, the start-
ing question is: does this oppress, does this cause pain, does this deny
someone full membership in the human community?, rather than what
does legal or other authority command. Thus, these scholars seek to make
law more liberating, more empowering, and less oppressive and painful
by listening to the stories of the oppressed. They seek to alleviate that
oppression by changing legal discourse, drawing on legal principles and
doctrines, and challenging attitudes about the givenness of existing social
and legal structures. They can do so by emphasizing rights as a means
to recognize individual human dignity, but they do not stop there. They
see human beings as capable of altruism as well as selfishness and sum-
mon us all to strive for human dignity and freedom from oppression in
whatever guise.
A humanitarian vision is willing to entertain notions of different forms
of goodness, as Patricia Williams has written. The humanitarian vision
is one "where whole new worlds of meaning are allowed to coexist, and
to contradict one another. In this happily cacophonous universe, white is
white and white is good, and black is good and black is really black."'88
Existing on numerous levels of awareness, simulataneously,
- Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989).
87 Examples of this rich and growing literature include K. KARST, supra note
15; Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV.
10 (1987); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reconing With Un-
conscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. (1987); Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Recon-
siderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988); and
the works of West, Williams, Bender, Hirschman, cited in this comment.
Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Oppor-
tunity, 87 MICH, L. REV. 2128, 2143 (1989).
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this perspective, the ambi-valent, multivalent way of seeing
that is ... at the heart of what is called critical theory, feminist
theory, and the so-called minority critique. It has to do with a
fluid positioning that sees back and forth across boundary, that
acknowledges that in certain circumstances I can be black and
good and black and bad, and that I can also be black and white,
male and female, yin and yang, love and hate.
Nothing is simple. Each day is a new labor.
89
Humanitarian jurisprudence can also be found in the work of a growing
number of scholars seeking to validate notions of love, care, and respon-
siveness to human pain in legal decisionmaking. 90 These scholars seek
substantive equality for victims of authoritarian hate and prejudice, and
use historical and phenomenological arguments to criticize legally-cre-
ated oppression, whether by omission or commissionY1 The State is not
necessarily the enemy, nor is positive law-it can be used to create a
more humane and less oppressive world. 92 This approach includes advo-
cacy that the government should protect family members from "private
violence" -either by arguing that the government should have been liable
for the negligence of its workers in the DeShaney93 child abuse case, or
by insisting the government recongize the harms to, and take appropriate
action to help, raped and battered spouses and children. 94 As Leslie Bender
has written, it would include using tort law "in encouraging and im-
proving our social relations, rather than reinforcing our divisions, dis-
parities of power, and isolation" by reformulating a standard of care to
be one of "'acting responsibly towards others to avoid harm, with a concern
about the human consequences of our acts or failure to act."'95
Humanitarian legal scholarship also seeks a way to make sure that
the benefits and burdens of being members of a community are truly
equally shared and not used to the continuing subordination of a race, a
Id. at 2151.
See, e.g., Minow, supra note 87; Resnick, supra note 87; Henderson, supra
note 72; West, Economic Man, Literary Woman, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1987).
91 See, e.g., BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 15; Looking to the Bottom, supra
note 75.92 Law's Republic, supra note 4, at 1533-35, also makes this point in the context
of civic republican/strong rights and principles scholarship.
9- DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Soc. Services, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989) (holding
that there is no right to "governmental aid" against "private violence"; state had
no duty to protect abused son from his father even though state aware of the
abuse). See also The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. REv. 137, 167-
77 (1989).
See, e.g., Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Per-
spectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23; Marital Rape
and Theories of Equality, supra note 70; Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, forthcoming Stan. L. Rev. (copy on
file with author);
9' Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL ED- 3,
32 (1988).
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group, or a gender. Examples include Catharine MacKinnon's redefinition
of sex discrimination under Title VII to include a cause of action against
the debilitating effects of sexual harrassment in the workplace 96 and
Charles Lawrence's and Mari Matsuda's challenge to the legal mind to
find a way to limit racist hate speech within the framework of the first
amendment that would be analogous to the limitations on defamation,
obscentity, and other painful forms of speech that the first amendment
does not absolutely protect.9 7
For example, Matsuda makes use of the stories of the victims of racist
hate speech and principles of basic humanity to critique our assumption
that such speech should enjoy complete first amendment protection, ar-
guing that such speech perpetuates racial oppression and fear. By un-
reflectively giving such speech complete protection, we are legitimating
the authoritarian message of race hatred.98 While Matsuda has argued
that "[a] range of legal interventions, including the use of tort law and
criminal law principles, is appropriate to combat racist hate speech," 99
thus appearing in part to approve of authoritarian cures for authoritarian
ills by way of criminal sanctions, a tort law that is restorative to the
victim would seem more healing than damaging to humanitarian ef-
forts.1°0 At a minimum, it is important that law not blindly approve or
legitimate racist oppression simply because it is "speech."
Similarly, MacKinnon has argued that the painful and degrading mes-
sage of pornography constitutes sex discrimination and perpetuates
hatred and violent oppression of women.' 0' The laws MacKinnon has
proposed or seen (briefly) on the books used tort law precepts, rather than
those of criminal law, which are at least not as punitive and authoritarian
as criminal sanctions. While one can conclude that the ordinances she
has proposed fail to account for pornography that is pleasurable rather
than painful and thus deny women's experience,'10 2 among other things,
C. Mackinnon, Sexual Harrassment in the Workplace (1979); C. Mackinnon,
Feminism Unmodified (198);97 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Hate Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Racist
Hate Speech, 1990 DUKE L.J..98Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Hate Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2380 (1989);
9Id. at 2360.
100 There are other possibilities as well: A possible alternative that recognizes
the pain Holocaust survivors would feel if Nazis marched through their town; at
the least, do not require them to pay for the police protection of the marchers.
Cf. id. at 2352-53.
'o'C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, 146-62 (1987); C. MACKINNON, To-
WARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 195-214 (1989); C. MACKINNON & A.
DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY & CIVIL RIGHTS (1988); MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil
Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985).
102 See West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WISC. WOMEN'S L.J. 81,116-39 (1987); West,
Pornography as a Legal Text in FOR ADULT USERS ONLY 108, 123-29 (S. Gubar &
J. Hoff, eds. (1989)).
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to be aware of the propaganda and messages of objectification and non-
humanness contained in much pornography'0 3 should give us pause if we
are seeking to recognize women as full members of the human community.
And, perhaps most important, MacKinnon's efforts have transformed the
debate about pornography in legal scholarship and thought: the question
of pornography no longer is portrayed as amusing, trivial, or unproblem-
matic. 0 4
Finally, feminist scholars have examined the pain and oppressive con-
sequences of unwanted pregnancy and have struggled to have women's
voices and women's morality heard in the debate over abortion.105 Fem-
inists have repeatedly demonstrated that women are capable of moral
choice, moral choice that may seem "immoral" by some patriarchal moral
systems or absolutist standards, but which is deeply moral in the sense
of responsibility and care in the complex particularity of any abortion
decision. And many feminists and humanist scholars hope, undoubtedly
correctly, that by ending poverty, cruelty, rape, and misogyny, all children
will be wanted and abortion will be rare if it does not disappear alto-
gether. 0 6
It is true that this all sounds good, but in practice this approach can
be trashed as irreconcilable, "romantic", or an unprincipled grab-bag of
notions. 0 7 Without rules to follow, another argument goes, you cannot
choose to act morally; you will give way to evil passions or bias. This is
a considerable leap from my rejection of moral absolutes, but perhaps
such reactions are inevitable, as there is not one "system" of deduction,
of narrow rationality, of doctrinal purity to fall back on. To say that
opposing cruelty is a principle, caring is a principle, ending classification
and domination of those we label Other is a principle seems hopelessly
"03 Given MacKinnon's definition of pornography in the Minneapolis ordinance
as that which is "the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically de-
picted, whether in pictures or in words, that includes ... women ... presented
in postures of sexual submission", C. MACKINNON & A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY
& CIVIL RIGHTS 101 (1988), I can imagine pornography that has nothing to do
with dehumanization, hatred, violence, or propaganda. But for a powerful de-
scription of the messages contained in pornography that demonstrates how de-
humanizing and hurtful it can be, see Brest & Vandenburg supra note 29; The
Nature of Domination, supra note 29.
1o4 See Brest & Vandenburg, supra note 29; Robel, Pornography and Existing
Law, in FoR ADULT USERS ONLY, supra note 101 at 178; Sunstein, supra note 29;
Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989).
10- See, e.g., sources cited in notes 61, 69 & 72, supra. See also Petchesky,
Introduction to Amicus Brief in Richard Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists, 9 WOMEN'S R.L. RPTR. 3, 4 (1986) (NARAL's amicus
brief in Thornburgh "transforms the terms of abortion discourse... by concretely
locating freedom of choice 'in the context of women's lives.')
106 N. NODDINGS, supra note 18 at 145-46, discusses this hope, but properly
severs it from the issue of the morality of abortion itself.
10, For a criticism of the use of stories, difference, emphathy, and arguments
of resistance to cruelty and human pain in legal decisionmaking, see Massaro,
Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989).
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general, strange, and unbounded. There is no guidance in the impulse to
help those in pain, according to the critic. But as Richard Rorty has
recently observed, opposition to cruelty in "post modern" society is a
realistic, intelligible, and vital ethical goal.108 But the critic might ask,
how will we make people behave morally and stop being beastly to each
other if they don't have rules to obey?109 Such a question, I would submit,
simply reveals how authoritarian we all are, how embedded in authori-
tarian beliefs and practices legal and ethical thought is. People are not
angels, but commanding them to be so and punishing them when they
are not does not appear to have reduced human misery much and may
have added to it by training us to be rigid, punitive, and intolerant of
those who differ from us.1 0
Seeking new worlds, better worlds, a striving we have seen repeatedly
in the last year in China, in Eastern Europe, and in a different way, in
the reaction of the women's movement in the United States to the Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services"' decision cannot be ignored just because
finding "the words to say it"'12 may be difficult, if not impossible, simply
because we do not have all the answers. Sensitivity and care, perhaps,
are better than pretensions to certainty as we move toward a vision also
articulated by Mari Matsuda:
The feminist utopia looks something like this: It is a place
without hierarchy, where children are nourished and told they
are special, where gardens grow wheat and roses, too, where
the desire to excel at the expense of another is thought odd,
where love is possible, and where the ordinary tragedies of
human life are cushioned by the care and concern of others." 3
It is a world without authoritarianism.
108 R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 141-98 (1989).
109The phrase is Mark Tushnet's and Joe Singer's. Tushnet, Critical Legal
Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
505, 514 (1986) (quoting Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1984)).
110 The original concern with authoritarianism and the authoritarian person-
ality did arise from concern with anti-Semitism and Naziism in Germany, and
the question of how a people capable of much creativity and beauty could per-
petrate atrocities on others. For a psychoanalytic view of the authoritarian effect
on children and adults, see A. MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD (1984).
",1 09 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
112 THE WORDS TO SAY IT, supra note 73.
1,sMatsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature:
A Feminist Critique of Rawl's Theory of Justice, 16 N. MEX. L. REv. 613, 622
(1986).
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